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RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of New 1Hampshire.
JONES ET AL. v. SURPRISE.
A person, who in this State, solicits or takes orders for spirituous liquors, to
be delivered at a place without this State, knowing, or having reasonable
cause to believe, that, if so delivered, the same wizi be transported to tlisState
and sold in violation of the laws thereof, cannot recover the price of such
liquors in the courts of this State, although the sale may be lawful in the State
where it takes place.
The rule of comity does not require a people to enforce in their courts of
justice, any contract which is injurious to their public rights, or offends their
morals, or contravenes their policy, or violates their public law.
Comity will not extend the remedy afforded by the laws of this State, to enforce a contract valid in the State or country where it is made, when it is
tainted by the illegal conduct, within the State, of the party seeking to
enforce it.

Assm.psrr, to recover a balance due for the sale of wines and
spirituous liquors. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement that the contract was void under Gen. Laws, chap. 109,

§ 18.
Facts found by the court. At the time of the sale of the
liquors in suit, the plaintiffs were liquor-dealers in Boston, and
the defendant a saloon-keeper in Suncook. The agent of the
plaintiffs solicited orders for the liquors, in the defendant's
saloon, and forwarded the orders to the plaintiffs in Boston, having no authority to make a contract for their sale. He informed
the defendant that the liquors would be delivered to him at the
plaintiffs' storerooms in Boston. When he solicited the orders
le had no knowledge of the provisions of Gen. Laws, chap.
109, § 18, and did not intend the violation of any law of this
State. He knew at the time of the sale that the defendant
bought for the purpose of selling in violation of law. The
liquors were delivered to carriers in Boston, for tle defendant,
and he paid the cost of transportation from Boston to Suncook,
where be received them. Their sale was authorized by the law
of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs claimed that the sale being
valid by the law of Massachusetts, the law of this State prohibiting the taking, or soliciting of orders did not invalidate it.
They further claimed that, as the statute prohibits the taking of
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orders for spirituous or distilled liquors only, they could recov(er
for the wines. There was evidence tending to show that the
wines were intoxicating.
M3-essrs. Bingham & Mitchell, and E. F. Jones, for plaintiffi.
Messrs. Albin & Mlartin, for defendant.
SMITH, J.-It is made a criminal offense for any person, not
an agent, to sell or keep for sale, spirituous liquors, or for any
person within this State, to solicit or take an order for spirituous liquor, to be delivered to any place without this State,
knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that, if
so delivered, the same will be transported to this State
and sold in violation of our laws. Gen. Laws, chap. 109,
§§ 13, 18. One question in this case is whether intoxicating wines are included within the terms of this statute. The
legislature has defined intoxicating liquor as follows: " By the
words 'spirit,' 'spirituous,' or ' intoxicating liquor' shall be intended all spirituous or intoxicating liquor, and all mixed liquor,
any part of which is spirituous or intoxicating, unless otherwise
expressly declared." Gen. Laws, chap. 1, §§ 1, 31. As intoxicating wines and other intoxicating fermented liquors are not
expressly excluded from the operation of Gen. Laws, chap. 109,
§§ 13, 18, 19, the only conclusion is that they come within the
prohibition of its terms. No reason appears why the legislature should prohibit the solicitation of orders for one class of
intoxicating liquors, and permit it as to others. The construetion of statutes is governed by legislative definitions; that of
indictments, by the ordinary use of language: State v. Adams,
51 N. H. 568; State v. .anterbury, 28 Id. 195.
The remaining question is, whether the plaintiffs can maintain an action in our courts for the price of liquors sold and delivered in a State where the sale is lawful, they having solicited
and taken orders for the liquors in this State, in violation of
our laws. That their authorized agent, who solicited and took
the orders, did not know the solicitation or taking of orders
was prohibited, and did not intend the violation of any law, is
immaterial. A person is presumed to know and understand,
not only the laws of the country where he dwells, but also those

JONES ET AL. -v. SURPRISE.

in which he transacts business. In Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H.
253, it was held by a majority of the court that mere solicitation,
by a dealer in liquors, of orders in the future for spirituous
liquors, even though he may have had reason to believe, and
did believe, that the liquors would be resold by the purchaser
in violation of the law of this State, is not such a circumstance
as will affect the validity of a subsequent sale of such liquors in
a State where the sale is not prohibited. N9,amerous decisions
in Eugland and in this country, upon the subject, were cited and
discussed in that case; and an extended review of most of the
same authorities may be found in Tacy v. Talmage, 14 N. T.
162. Further discussion of the authorities is not called for at
the present time. When Hill v. Spear was decided, the soliciting
of orders for spirituous liquors to be delivered without the
State, was not prohibited. The present statute (Gen. Laws,
chap. 109, §§ 18, 19), first enacted in 1876 (Laws 1876, chap.
33), makes the mere soliciting or taking of such orders, or the
going from place to place soliciting or taking such orders, with
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the liquors will be
transported to this State and sold in violation of law, without any
other act in furtherance of the vendee's design, a criminal
offense punishable by fine or imprisonment. The plaintiffs'
authorized agent, who solicited and took these orders from the
defendant, knew the liquors were to be kept and sold by the
defendant in this State, in violation of law. His knowledge is,
in law, the knowledge of the plaintiffs.
Theplaintiffs contend that, inasmuch as the soliciting of orders
constituted no part of the contract when the soliciting was not
prohibited, the act of soliciting, now that it is made illegal, cannot vitiate a contract of which it forms no part. The case is
not affected by the plaintiffs' ability to prove a sale without
proof of the solicitation. No people are bound to enforce or
hold valid in their courts of justice any contract which is injurious to their public rights, or offends their morals, or contravenes their policy, or violates public law. And every independent community will judge for itself how far the rule of comity
between States is to be permitted to interfere with its domestic
interests and policy: 2 Kent. Coin. 457, 458; Bill v. Spear, 50
N. I. 253, 262; Thliss v. Brainard,41 Id. 256, 258. The ob-
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ject of the statute of 1876 (Gen. Laws, chap. 109, §§ 18, 19),
was to discourage the sale of liqjuor in other States, to be transported to this State and sold iu violation of its statutes. -New
Hampshire cannot prohibit the ! ale of liquor in other States,
but it can punish, as it does by this statute, acts done in this
State with the purpose of facilitating sales of intoxicating
liquors in other States, to be transported to this State, and to be
illegally sold here, in contravention of our policy and to the injury of our citizens. The statute was intended to make such
sales and transportation difficult, if not impossible, by sulbjccting those who violate its provisions to the penalty of line or imprisonment. Where a statute provides a penalty for an act, this
is a prohibition of the act. In Bartlett v. T7-mor, Carth. 252;
s. c. Skin. 322, I-oLT, Ch. J., said: " Every contract made for
or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made
unlawful by any statute, is a void contract, though the statute
itself doth not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a
penalty on the offender, because a penalty implies a 1 rohibition,
though there are no prohibitory words in the statute." Accordingly, it is everywhere held that wherever an indictment can be
sustained for the illegal sale of liquors or other goods, there the
price cannot be recovered: Bliss v. Brainard, 41 N. 11. 256,
268 ; Smith v. Godfrey, 28 Id. 384; Caldwell v. Ientiworth, 14
Id. 431 ; Lezvis v. Welch, Id. 294 ; Pray v. Burbank, 10 Id.
377; and if this was a New Hampshire contract, the plaintiffs
could not recover. The law does not help the seller to recover
the price of goods, the sale of which it interdicts. The reason
of this rule applies in this case. Although this is a Mlassachusetts contract, it had its inception in this State, in direct violation
of our laws. Orders for these liquors were solicited and taken
here by the plaintiffs' agent, sent here for that purpose, were
transmitted by him to the plaintiffs, were accepted by them, and
became the basis of the contract which they seek to enforce in
this State. The orders are evidence for the plaintiffs as to price,
quantity, and kinds of liquors purchased, as well as of an offer
by the defendant to purchase, if, indeed, it is not true that the
plaintiffs cannot prove their case without founding it upon the
orders. Both the soliciting and taking of the orders was an
indictable offense in which the agent was principal.
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The inciting, encouraging, and aiding another to commit a
misdemeanor is itself a misdemeanor: Russ. Cr. 46, 47. The
plaintiffs stand precisely as they would, if they, instead of their
agent, had solicited and taken the orders: Gen. Laws, chap.
284, § 7. Having aided, abetted, procured, and hired their
agent to violate our laws, by soliciting and taking orders for
the very liquors embraced in this contract, they cannot with any
grace invoke the remedy afforded by our laws to recover the
price. iNo rule or comity requires us to enforce, in favor of a
non-resident, a contract which had its origin in the open violation of law, and which would not be enforced in favor of our
own citizens, especially when it is offensive to our morals,
opposed to our policy, and injurious to our citizens. Its enforcement would tend to nullifj, the statute which the plaintiffs have
caused to be violated. The law which prohibits an end, will
not lend its aid in promoting the means designed to carry it
into effect. It does not promote in one form, that which it
prohibits in another: White v. Russ, 3 Cush. 448, 450. The
opinion in Hill v. Spear (50 N. H. 264), concedes that there
could be no recovery if the plaintiffs had actively participated
in an illegal act in effecting the sale, and is put upon the ground
that Stewart, their agent, did not advise, request, or encourage
any violation of the laws of this State.
In Bliss v. Brainard,41 N. H. 256, 268, we said: "Where
a contract grows immediately out of, and is connected with, an
illegal or immoral act, a court of justice will not lend its aid to
enforce it. So, if the contract be in part only connected with
the illegal consideration, but growing immediately out of it,
though it be, in fact, a new and separate contract, it is equally
tainted by it." In that case the plaintiff sought to recover for
the value of the casks in which the liquors were contained, and
for the freight and cartage of the liquors, the sale of the liquors
being unlawful. FOWLER, J., said: "Aside, therefore, from
the positive provisions of the Massachusetts statute, withdrawing all protection from vessels and casks when employed as the
instruments for perpetrating a violation of positive law, we
think the sale of the casks was so tainted with the illegality of
the sale of the liquors, so much a part of the res gestcw of the
main illegal and criminal transaction, and so much the mere
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instrument whereby it was accomplished, that no action can
be maintained to recover their price." For analogous reasons
the plaintiffs in this case cannot recover. Although this is a
Alassachusetts contract, valid in that State, it is so tainted by
the plaintiffs' illegal conduct in soliciting, taking, and transmitting orders in violation of the statute, that comity will not
extend to them the remedy afforded by our laws. The taking
of such orders tends directly to encourage the illegal sale of
liquors in this State, and being prohibited, it follows that an
action to recover the price of liquors sold and delivered pursuant to orders so solicited, cannot be maintained in this State,
although the sale of intoxicating liquors in the State or country
where they are sold and delivered, is not illegal: Dtunbar v.
Locke, 62 N. H.
Judgment for the defendant.
CARPE.NTER, J., did not sit; the others concurred.
It is well settled, that the validity
of a contract is to be decided by the
law of the place where it was made,
unless it was agreed, either expressly
or impliedly, that it should be performed elsewhere; in which case, the
general rule, according to the better
opinion, is that the contract, ,as to its
validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the
law of the place of performance:
Story Confl. Laws,
298 et seq.;
Hill v. Spear, 50 N. I. 253. See,
however, 2 Pars. on Cont. *582, and
cases cited.
It may also be regarded as settled
that contracts, valid by the law of the
place where made, are generally valid
everywhere, juregentium. And if, in
the place where the contract is made,
the policy of the local law would enforce it, it will also be enforced in the
jurisdiction to which a party may be
compelled to resort for the application
of a remedy for the violation of such
contract. An exception to this rule,
however, consists in this, that no

nation or State is bound to recognize
or enforce any contracts which are injurious to its own interests or the welfare of its own people, or which are
in fraud and violation of its own laws:
Hill v. Spear,supra, where the question
will be found well considered. In
that case, E. kept a saloon in M. in
New Hampshire, where he was accustomed to retail spirituous liquors
contrary to law. S. was a dealer in
such liquors in the State of New
York, where such traffic was not prohibited. S. had visited E.'s saloon in
M. and on one occasion had solicited
orders from E. for liquors. Subsequently, S. sold to E. a quantity of
spirituous liquors, the contract of sale
of which was made and completed
and the goods delivered in New York.
S. had no interest nor concern in the
disposition of the liquors by E., and
did no act beyond the sale to E. in
furtherance of E.'spurpose to sell the
same in New Hampshire; but there
was evidence tending to show that S.
when he solicited orders from E. prior
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to the sale of the liquors, had reasonable cause to believe and did believe
that E. intended to resell the same
at his saloon in New Hampshire.
Upon this state of facts, it was Held,
that the contract of sale being valid
by the lwS of New York, should be
enforced in New Hampshire. BELxows, C. J., dissented from thi.t decision, upon the ground that the coming
into the State and soliciting orders for
liquors and encouraging the party to
Iny and sell contrary to law, was such
a direct participation of the vendor
in tile violation of law as to preclude
a recovery. It did not appear, however, that there was any express
solicitation of this order, which was
made by letter (not, however, according to the view of FOSTER, J., who delivered the opinion of the majority
of the court, in pursuance of nny
previous contract or understanding) ;
and the liquors so ordered were delivered by the vendor to a carrier in
New York, conveyed to E. in New
IIampshire, where they were received
by imn. There was no evidence that
tie vendor advised, requested, or encouraged the sale of liquors by E.
contrary to law, in any other way
than by soliciting him to purchase
them as above stated; nor thatlhehad
any participation in te resale otherwise than by furnishing them to E.
for a price which does not appear to
have been regulated by any consideration relative to theirfinal disposition.
It did not appear that the vendor at
the time of the sale, had any actual
knowledge of E.'s purpose or intentions with regard to their disposition; and the majority of the
court treated the contract simply as
one of slle and delivery, in New
York, where the sale was legal.
The question involved in lill v.
Spear was ably and exhaustively discussed, and in our judgment the conVoL. XXXVI.-40.

clusion arrived at, was in accordance
with reason and authority. .Hill v.
Spear was decided in December, 1870.
In 1876, the legislature of that
State passed an act, which will be
found in H 18, 19, Ch. 109, of the
Gen. Laws of New Hampshire, whioh
read as follows:
" 18. If any person Ehall within
this State solicit or take any order for
any spirituous liquor to be delivered at
any wharf, depot, or other place without this State, knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe, that if so
delivered the same will be transported
to this State and sold in violation of
the laws thereof, he shall lie fined $50
for the first offense of which he shall
be convicted," etc.
" 19. If any person shall go from
place to place soliciting or taking
orders for spirituous liquors to be delivered as aforesaid, and with the
purpose aforesaid, he shall be fined,"
etc.
Under this statute arose the principal case. The soundness of the rule
laid down in Hill v. Spear, that the
validity of a vendoFs claim to recover
the price of goods sold with knowledge
that the purchaser intends to make
an unlawful use of them, depends
upon the circumstance whether or not
the original vendor participated
actively, to a greater or less extent in
the subsequent unlawful disposition
of the goods; or whether the expectation of advantage and profit to
him growing out of the unlawful disposition of the goods by the purchaser, entered into and constituted a
part of the inducement and consideration of the original sale; that if such
expectation of advantage to the vendor, was an ingredient in the consideration for the original sale, or if the
original vendor participated in the
subsequent unlawful disposition of the
goods, he cannot recover the price
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thereof in the courts of the State to
which they are taken for sale contrary
to law ; but that- mere belief on the
part of the vendor, that the purchaser buys for the purpose of carrying
them into suchotherState to be there
resold in violation of law, does not
invalidate the sale, is not in the least
shaken or impaired by the decision in
the principal case. There can be no
doubt that the contract in the principal case was a M.issachusetts con tract
and hence valid in that State. But
the principal case differs from Hill v.
Spear, in the very important fact that
the plaintiffs' authorized agent who
solicited and took the orders from the
defendant, was sent to New Ilampshire to take such orders and knew
the liquors were to be kept and sold
by the defendant in New Hampshire,
in violation of law; that the orders
were transmitted by such agent to
plaintiff, were accepted by him and
became the basis of the contract in

question; and also that both the soliciting and taking of such orders was[Brown v.
an indictable offense.
Browntig, S. Ct. It 1., December 9,
1886, on a conflict of Sunday laws,
and Brown v. Finance Co., U. S. C. Ct.
S. Dist. N. Y., lay 1, 1887, on a
conflict of usury laws, point out the
distinction to be observed between iutmoral contracts and those simply forbidden.-J. B. U.]
In addition to Hill v. Spear, and
the cases cited in the opinion in the
principal case, the reader's attention
is especially called to the leading
case of lolman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341,
decided by Lord MAINSFIELD in 1775 ;
Gaylord v. Soragen, 32 Vt. 110; Aiken
v. Blaisdell, 41 Id. 65C; Territt v.
Bartlett, 21 Id. 184; Adans v. Coulliard, 102 'Mass. 167 ; Finch v. Mausfield, 97 Id. 89; Story on Cont.,
625.
M. D. EwNELL.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
THE MUNCIE NATIONAL BANK v. BROWN.
A notary public had, for several years, been using a seal of his own, but, in
attesting the certificate of acknowledgment to the chattel mortgage involved in
this action, used a seal belonging to another person. The designs of the seal
were somewhat different, one of them bearing the words, "Notary Public, Seal,
Indiana," the other bearing the words, "Notary Public, Delaware Co., Ind."
Held, that the certificate was not invalidated, and that the mortgage was endtled to be admitted to record.
The mistake or wrong of a public officer, in placing a seal upon a certificate of acknowledgment, is not available under an answer of general denial,
where the instrument is fair and perfect on its face.
A mortgagee has a right to a personal judgment and to a decree establishing
his lien, although the mortgaged property is in the hands of a receiver.
A description of personal property, stating in general terms its character, and
specifically stating in what building and rooms it is situated, is sufficient.
Under the statutes of Indiana, friud is a question of fact, and a chattel
mortgage cannot, as matter of law, be adjudged fraudulent because it contains

TIE MUNCIE NATIONAL BANK v. BROWN.
a provision authorizing the mortgagor to dispose of the property and account
to the mortgagee.
A plaintiff who takes a personal judgment for the amount of his debt, does
not merge the mortgage nor lose his right to subsequently foreclose it; but
he may, on a subsequent day of the term, take a decree foreclosing the mort-

gage.
A creditor who accepts a second mortgage, which expressly recites that it is
subject to a prior mortgage, is estopped to attack it on the ground that it was
made to defraud creditors.

from the Delaware Circuit Court.
A..D. lIarris and T.IrI. Calkins, for appellant.
APPEAI,

John K Ryan, for appellee.
ELLiOT, J.-Cornelia A. Brown brought this suit to foreclose a mortgage on real and personal property, executed to her
on the thirty-first day of January, 1885, by her husband, Francis Al. Brown. The promissory notes, which the mortgage was
executed to secure, bear date January 13, 1879; November 22,
1879; January 22, 1882; August 29, 1883; and September 13,
1884. The personal property is thus described in the mort 2
gage: "The dry goods, carpets, hats, caps, clothing, notions,
gentlemen's and ladies' furnishing goods, queensware, groceries, and all other goods, wares, and merchandise constituting the
stock in trade heretofiore owned by Francis Ml. Brown, and contained in the store-room and cellar belonging to and part of the
west room on the street-grade floor, known as the 'Boyce Block,'
on the north side of East Main street, in the city of Muncie,
in said county and State, and also all of the wool, rags, feathers, and other country produce, and all of the show and display
cases, and store furniture and fixtures, and gas fixtures, and all
other property of whatever kind in said store-room, situate as
aforesaid, and all of the promissory notes and book-accounts now
owned 'by the said mortgagor, for indebtedness growing out of
the mortgagor's mercantile business." It is recited in the mortgage, among other things, that "it is hereby stipulated, cx)rcs.ly, as the true intent of this mortgage, to prefer the said
claim of the said Cornelia A. Brown as herein described, over
and above all other of the said Francis Ml. Brown's indebtedness." There is also in the mortgage this agreement: "It is
agreed and understood by and between the parties to this mortgage that the said Francis 5T. Brown shall retain possession of
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all of said merchandise and personal property hereby mortgaged, and may continue selling and disposing of the said mortgaged merchandise for cash, as heretofore, until all of said debts
shall become due, or until such preference mortgagee, Cornelia A.
Brown, shall demand possession thereof, which she may at any
time hereafter do; but that said Francis M. Brown shall, at the
end of each and every calendar month hereafter, fully and lionestly account for all of the proceeds of such sales, and, after deducting therefrom necessary expenses of conducting such business, shall pay over the remainder to the mortgagee." Subsequent to the execution of the mortgage to the appellee, Francis
M. Brown executed a mortgage to the Muncie National Bank,
which it accepted with actual knowledge of the prior mortgage.
The bank brought suit to foreclose its mortgage on the second
day of February, 1885, and asked for the appointment of a
receiver. In accordance with the prayer of the complaint,
Marcus S. Claypool was appointed a receiver, and as such took
possession of the store and goods. Cornelia A. Brown brought
this suit after the bank had filed its complaint and secured a
receiver. The mortgagor made default, and damages were
assessed against him. After this had been done, the bank filed
a cross-complaint, and, in conjunction with the receiver, filed a
motion to set aside the default against Brown. At the same
time, the other appellants were admitted to defend, and were
allowed to assail the appellee's mortgage. The trial court sustained the motion to set aside the default as to Francis M.
Brown, and entered an order setting it aside.
The first proposition argued by appellant's counsel is thus
stated: "The mortgage was not entitled to be put of record,
and therefore was never recorded." The argument, of which
this proposition is the foundation, rests on the testimony of the
notary public by whom the acknowledgment of Francis M.
Brown was taken. From that testimony it appears, that the
notary borrowed a seal in 1871, and used it in authenticating
his official certificates, but did not use it in this particular
instance. The seal which he attached to the certificate annexed
to the appellee's mortgage -was obtained at the office where the
mortgage was written. The designs of the seals are somewhat
unlike, and the words differently arranged. The words of one
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are, "Notary Public, Seal, Indiana ;" and those of the other
are, "Notary Public, Delaware Co., Ind." It cannot be assuuied that there was no seal, since there was a seal actually
impressed upon the paper. On the face of the instrument, the
certificate was perfect in form and in authentication. We cannot,
therefore, hold that there was no acknowledgment. The utmost
that can be asserted is, that the notary public did not do his
duty as the law requires, by attaching the seal he was accustomed to use. He did, in fact, take the acknowledgment of the
mortgagor ; he did execute and sign the proper certificate; and
he did affix a seal to the certificate. If the acknowledgment
must be condemned, it is because the officer did wrong in using
a seal not his own. No one can perceive how this breach of
duty could have worked injury to any person in the world.
Whether the one seal or the other was used, did not add to or
take from the certificate any real efficacy. If the notary, two
hours before the acknowledgment, had thrown away his old
seal and adopted another, certainly no real harm to any person
could have been done. Nor is it easy to see how the mere use
of one seal instead of another, where both are mere general
seals without any peculiar marks or names, could do anybody
any harm. Courts ought not, as it seems to us, to strike down
a mortgage for such a breach of duty, unless the law imperatively requires it. We cannot believe that the law requires
such a result in a ease where, as here, a notarial seal is used,
although not the one the notary kept for use.
We have examined the cases of M'ason v. Brock, 12 Ill. 273;
Buell v. Irvin, 24 Mlich. 153; AtoKellar v. Peck, 39 Tex. 381 ;
IHinckley v. O'Farrel, 4 Blackf. 185; Du-mont v. McOracken,
6 Id. 355; Mlaxy v. Mse, 25 Ind. 1; Pope v. Cutler, 34
Mich. 151, and Wletmore v. Laird, 5 Biss. 160, and our conclusion is that they are not of controlling force, for in none of those
cases was the question presented as it is in the case before us.
Here, a notarial seal was actually used, and the mistake of the
officer consisted simply in using one not his own.
The case that most nearly approaches the present, is that of
.2lcKellar v. Pecl, supra, where the seal of the clerk was used ;
but conceding that the decision there made was correct, which
we doubt, it is obvious that it is not fully in point here. If
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there had been no seal at all, or if the seal had not been an
appropriate notarial seal, a very different question would confront us. Even in such a case, however, it is doubtful whether
the error was a fatal one, since there are very respectable authorities justifying the conclusion that the mistake was one
that might be cured by amendment: Jordan v. Corey, 2 Ind.
385; Hunter v. Burnsville, 56 Id. 223 ; Arnold v. Nye, 23
Mich. 293; Sowfield v. Thompson, 42 Ark. 46. If, however,
we are wrong in our conclusions upon this point, it would not
change the result, for it would not lead to a reversal. There
was no pleading attacking the certificate of the notary public,
and therefore no issue under which a defense founded on the
use of another's seal in attesting the certificate was available.
There is a seal attached to the certificate. It is the seal of a
notary public, and it has no peculiar marks indicating that it
was not the seal of the officer by whom it was used. It is a
general seal, and such as our law recognizes as valid: Lange v.
State, 95 Ind. 114. The presumption is that the officer did his
duty, and this presumption is aided by the indications apparent
on the face of the instrument. In order to entitle the parties
assailing the mortgage, to avail themselves of any breach of
duty on the part of the officer, it was necessary for them to
affirmatively plead the facts constituting the breach.
It is true that the complaint avers that the mortgage was
acknowledged and recorded, and that this averment is met by
the general denial, but we do not think that this denial did more
than require the plaintiff to produce an instrument showing on
its face due execution, acknowledgment, and registry. The
presumption in favor of the official acts of the notary, aided, as
it was, by the indications on the face of the instrument, made
a prima facie case. This prima face case stands until overthrown: Bates v. Pricket, 5 Ind. 22. It cannot be overthrown,
in any event, without some pleading attacking the conduct of
the officer, since all that the general denial required of the
plaintiff was the production of an instrument perfect on its
face, and bearing the seal and signature of an officer, apparently regular and in due form. We have many analogous
cases, in which it is held that an unverified general denial does
no more than impose upon the plaintiff the duty of producing

THE MUNCIE NATIONAL BANK v. BROWN.

815

an instrument perfect in form. These cases certainly apply.
where, as here, there is neither imperfection nor irregularity.
apparent on the lace of the instrument, but where, in order to
establish an irregularity, it is necessary to investigate the official
acts of a public officer. The case, therefore, is much stronger
than one in which the mistake or irregularity grows out of the
acts of a party. It seems quite clear to our minds that such a
field of investigation ought not to be opened without an affirmative pleading, challenging the conduct of the officer whose acts
are assailed. Any other rule would defeat the purpose of our
code, which, as is well known, is to require such pleadings as
will fairly inform a party what he is expected to meet.
Counsel thus state their second proposition: "The decree for
the sale of the property is void." The argument made in support of this proposition is that the property was in the handq
of a receiver appointed by the court in the suit brought by the
bank. Whatever of force there might be, if the point had first
been appropriately made in the trial court, there is none in it as
made in this court. It seems, indeed, that, under our decisions,
the point would not have been well taken in the trial court. So.
far as the complaint demanded a personal judgment against the
mortgagor, and a declaration of the lien of the mortgage, it was
undeniably good: Ohio, etc., Co. v. Nickless, 71 Ind. 271 ;
Railroad Co. v. .Alellett, 92 Id. 537; Gilbert v. AleCorkle, 110
Id. 215. But, however this may be, we regard it as clear, that
the complaint cannot be successfully attacked by the assignment
of errors on the ground that the property was in the possession
of a receiver. The mortgagee undoubtedly had a right to a
judgment, and to have her lien established, and to that extent,
at least, if not to a much greater, her complaint was good. If
good only to the extent stated, it would repel even a demurrer:
Bayless v. Glenn, 72 Ind. 5. It certainly will, therefore, repel
an attack made for the first time, after the finding.
The third proposition of counsel is this: "The mortgage is
void for uncertainty; also, because it provides for continued
possession." Although the proposition is in form single, in
substance it is double. The first proposition refers to the
description of the mortgaged property. The question involved
has often been before this court, and descriptions much less
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specific have been held sufficient: Duke v. Strickland, 43 Ind.
494; Ebberle v. .1ayer,51 Id. 235; Bu'ns v. Jlarri1,66 Id. 536;
Zehner v. Aultinan, 74 Id. 24. These decisions are well sustained. The authorities are collected in an article in 24 Cent.
Law J. 339, where many cases very like the present, will be
found. The second proposition involved in the general statement, is based upon cases which hold, that where a mortgage
clothes the mortgagor with authority to retain possession of the
property and sell it in the ordinary course of bu.siness, it is
fraudulent and void as to creditors. It is quite doubtful whether
the mortgage of the appellee falls within those cases, since it
provides that sales shall be made for the benefit of the mortgagee;
but we need not discuss this question, for, under our statute,
fraud is a question of fact, and cannot be decided upon the face
of a mortgage authorizing the mortgagor to sell the mortgaged
property. We cannot hold that a provision in a chattel mortgage, vesting the right of disposition in the mortgagee, vitiates
the mortgage, for our statute and our decisions declare a very
different rule: MeLaugldin v. Ward, 77 Ind. 383; Morris v.
Stern, 80 Id. 227; McFadden v. Hopkins, 81 Id. 459 ; Louthain
v. Miller, 85 Id. 161; Berghoff v. McDonald, 87 Id. 549;
McFadden v. Fritz, 90 Id. 590; Dessar v. Field, 99 Id. 548;
Stix v. Sadler, 109 Id. 254.
The fourth proposition of counsel is thus expressed : "Taking
personal judgment for $15,490, merged the suit into that
judgment." We cannot assent to this doctrine. We know of
no principle upon which it can be held, that a party who sues
on a note and mortgage, is precluded from obtaining a decree of
foreclosure, by taking a judgment for the amount due, in a case
where the decree for the foreclosure is prevented by the interposition of intervening creditors. We concedo as broadly as
can be claimed, the rule that a party cannot split his demands,
but must recover in one action: Crosby v. Jeroloman, 37 Ind.
277; City v. Hudnut,[S. Ct. Ind., November 1, 1887,] and cases
cited. But there was here no splitting of demands. There was
one suit, and all the damages were assessed, so that the rule can
have no application. We suppose it to be well settled, that a
persdnal judgment may be taken on a promissory note, secured
by a mortgage, in an independent action, and that a foreclosure
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of the mortgage may be secured in a subsequent suit. We cannot conceive vhy a plaintiff cannot enter a personal judgment
on one day of the term, and on a subsequent day enter a decree
of foreclosure, even in a case where the decree is not postponed
by the action of intervening creditors. The judgment merges
the cause of action so that no second judgment can be obtained;
but it does not merge the mortgage security. The authorities
go so far as to hold that the decree of foreclosure does not merge
the lien of the mortgage, although it merges the mortgage as a
cause of action: Teal v. I-inhman, 69 Ind. 379 ; Evansville,
etc., Co. v. State, 73 Id. 219 ; itanns v. Bank, Id. 243-246 ;
Pence v. Armstrong, 95 Id. 191-207 ; Curtisv. Gooding, 99 Id.
45-51. But here, there was no decree of foreclosure, so that
there vas not even a merger of the mortgage as a cause of action,
and surely the lien continued until foreclosed. If the lien continued until foreclosed, then it is not possible that it could have
been merged by a simple personal judgment. A personal
judgment cannot drown the mortgage security; nothing but a
decree of foreclosure can do so much; and until this drowning
takes place there can be no merger. A personal judgment does
not extinguish the mortgage lien, and, until extinguished, it is
enforceable by a decree. Counsel loose sight of the fact that, in
every case like this, there are two distinct things, a debt, and
the mortgage securing it. A personal judgment does not extinguish the debt, although it merges it as a cause of action.
But, while there is a merger of the debt in the personal judgment,
the lien of the mortgage remains unaffected. The mortgage will
sustain a suit for a decree of foreclosure, although there may be
a personal judgment. Until there is a foreclosure, there is no
judgment merging, or even impairing, the mortgage security.
The trial court sustained the motion of the appellee to strike
out all evidence tending to prove that the mortgage executed to
the appellee, was fraudulent. The Muncie National Bank is
not in a situation to complain of this ruling, for in the mortgage
which it accepted, that executed to the appellee is recognized
as valid. It is recited in the former mortgage that "it is expressly stipulated herein, that this mortgage is made second and
subsequent to that of one executed to Cornelia A. Brown and
John C. Jenners to secure the payment of certain of the indebtVoL. XXXVI.--41

318-

THE MUNCIE NATIONAL BANK v. BROWN.

edness of the said Francis AT. Brown to them and each of them,
as described iu said mortgage."
$aving
treated the mortgage
as a valid one, the bank cannot be allowed to assail it on the
ground that it was made with the intent to defraud creditors :
Rennick v. Bank, 8 Ohio, 535; Irwin v. Longworth, 20 Id.
581; Bump, Fraud. Cony. 465.
The cross-complaint is good as against Francis MAT.
Brown.
It is not good as against the appellee, so far as it attempts to
charge her with fraud; but it is good, iuso far as it shows that
she claimed an interest in the property incontroversy. The demurrer to it was therefore properly overruled. But, in overruling this demurrer, the trial court did not decide that it would
receive evidence tending to prove that the mortgage was executed to defraud creditors. A court, in passing upon a demurrer, does not decide in advance, what evidence will or will not
be received ; nor is a court bound to adhere to its decision, for
it is well settled that it may reconsider a ruling on demurrer and
rectify an error. It cannot, therefore, be justly assumed that
the court misled the appellants. A party who files a bad pleading, and not the court, is in fault. The appellants were in fault
in not making their cross-complaint sufficient for all that they
desired it to accomplish ; and we cannot conceive how the trial
court can, with justice, be censured for not giving them more than
their pleading entitled them to demand. As there was no pleading entitling the appellants to introduce the evidence struck out,
we cannot condemn the ruling of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Why a seal is required. In .3fason
v. Brocd,, 12111. 273, a notary public
used a mere scroll, and this was held
not sufficient. In passing upon the
question, the court said, " In our
opinion, the certificate of the notary
is fatally defective.
The statute
imperatively requires it to be under
his official seal. It makes the affixing
of the official seal an indispensable
part of the certificate. Without the
seal, the certificate is incomplete and
imperfect. It hasno validity or efficacy,
unless the seal is added. It might as

well be insisted, that a writ of error issued from this court, which was not under the seal of thecourt, would be valid,
or to say that a certificate of acknowledgment by a notary need not be
evidenced by his notarial seal. The
same authority that requires the process to be under the seal of the court,
directs the certificate to be under the
official seal of the notary. The courts
have no more power to dispense with
the requirements of the statute in the
one case than in the other. It is only
by the force of the statute, that the
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certificate of a notary has any effect,
as evidence of the execution of a
deed; and the statute requires it to
be under the official seal of the officer.
A certificate, which is not verified by
11AN11 UL UlllCU,
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efficacy from the statute. Wecannot
say that the seal is a mere formality
that adds nothing to the dignity or
solemnity of the instrument. It is
enough that the law positively requires it. The propriety of the requisition rests with tile egislature.
A notary is empowered to take the
acknowledgment of a deed and certify
the same under his official seal. Ie
has no power to do it in any other
manner. If he has no notarial seal,
with which to authenticate his official
acts, lie is destitute of any authority
to certify the acknowledgment of a
deed. He must procure an official
seal, before the authority, conferred
on him to take the acknowledgment
of deeds, attaches. He cannot make
use of a scroll or private seal for the
purpose of authenticating acertificate
of acknowledgment. The provisions
of law allowing certain officers to use
private seals until they should be
provided with public seals, had no
application to a notary. Ile has to
provide hinsclf with an official seal.
It is not furnished him by the public.
Tie statute is silent as to the form
and character of the seal. He may
adopt a seal, with such an inscription
as his judgment may dictate or his
fancy suggest. It must, however, be
capable of making a definite and uniform impression on the paper on
which the certificate is written, or on
some tenacious substance attached
thereto, so that when a question arises
as to the genuineness of an authentication, it may be determined by
reference to the seal in the possession
of the officer."
Consequently the
acknowledgment of a deed by a

married woman, not having been
attested by the seal of a notary, was
held invalid. (See also, citations,
infra.)
Kind of seal. A notary public
canot1

use a
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his official acts: .1cKeler v. Peck, 39
Texas, 381. The purposeof hishaviag
a seal, is to authenticate his acts, and
there is no other reason for his having
one: Stephens v. Williams, 46 Iowa,
540; see Tuni. v. Withrow, 10 Id. 305.
The seal must be such as will make a
distinct impression upon paper; and
a mere s6roll in ink upon the paper
or wafer, is not sufficient: StTens v.
Williams, 46 Iowa, 540; citing Gage
v. Dubuque & Pacific B?. R., 11 Id.
310; linecklcy v. O'Farrell,4 Blackf.
185; J1Mason v. Brolk, supra; Richard
v. Boiler, 6 Daly, 460; s. c. 51 How.
Pr. 371 ; and the certificate of a
county clerk, who is authorized to
certify to the official character of the
notary, will not cure the absence of
his seal from his certificate: ,Stephens
v. Williams, supra. A printed seal is
of no effect: Richard v .Boller, supra;
-Ross v. Bedel, 5 Duer, 462. Concerning the form of the seal, see the
quotation, supra, from Mason v.
Brock.
In Collins v. Boyd, 5 Dana, 316, it
was held, tlmat an officer might affix
to a certificate of acknowledgment, a
seal which he,was accustomed to use
as his official seal, though lie described
it in the attestation clause as " his
private seal," no seal of the office
having been provided.
In Lange v. State, 95 Ind. 114, the
seal used had the following only upon
it: "Notary Public, Seal, Indiana."
The statute required "such a seal as
will stamp upon paper, a distinct impression, in words or letters sufficiently indicating his official character,
to which may be added such other device as he may choose." The court
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held the seal sufficient, saying: " We
think the seal does indicate the official character of the officer, and that
is all the statute requires. The statute
does not require that the seal shall
state the name of the county in which
the notary resides or for which lie
was appointed." See Piercev. Indseth,
106 U. S. 546.
J. P.'sseal. A justice of the peace
is not required to use anything but a
scroll; and there is no presumption
that he has an official seal: Dumont v.
Mc(!'acken, 6 Blackf. 355.
"Given under my hand and offal
seal." It is not necessary to state that
the certificate is given under his hand
and seal, when the seal and signature
are in fact affixed: .Harringtonv. Fish,
10 Mich. 415. Nor is it necessary to
say it was given under an "official"
seal, if the notarial seal is in fact
affixed; "under seal" being sufficient:
.3loore v. Titman, 33 Ill. 358; Monroe
v. Arledge, 23 Texas, 478: Contra,Wetmore v. Laird, 5 Biss. 160. Where
the ph rase used was "Given under my
hand of office," it was held sufficient;
for every person must know what was
meant: Nichols v. ,Stewart, 15 Texas,
226.
The use of waz. "Formerly, wax
was the most convenient and the only
material used to receive and retain
the impression of the seal. Hence it
was sa d: Sigillum est cera impressa;
guia cera, sine impressione non est
sigillum. But this is not an allegation
that an impression without wax is not
a seal, and for this reason courts have
held that an impression made on wafers
or other adhesive substance capable
of receiving an impression, will come
within the definition of'ecra impressa'
If, then, wax be construed to be merely
a general term, including within it
any substance capable of receiving and
retaining the impression of a seal, we
cannot perceive why paper, if it have

that capacity, should not as well be
included in the category. The simple
and powerful machines now used to
impress public seals, do not require
any soft adhesive substance to receive
or retain their impression. The impression made by such- a power on
paper, is as well defined, or durable,
and less likely to be destroyed or defaced by vermin, accident or intention,
than that made on wax. It is the seal
which authenticates and not the substance on which it is impressed; and
when the court can recognize its identity, they should not be called upon
to analyze the material which exhibits it :" Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How.
472. This was said of a court's seal.
Of a Norway notary's seal, it was
said: "The use of wax or some other
adhesive substance, upon which the
seal of a public officer may be impressed, has long ceased to be regarded
as important. It is enough, in the
absence of positive law prescribing
otherwise, that the impress of the seal
is made upon the paper itself, in such
a manner as to be readily identified
upon inspection:" Pierce v. Indseth,
106 U. S. 546.
Place to attach seal. "If the certificate be 'under his hand and seal of
office,' it is sufficient, and it cannot be
of any importance where the seal is
affixed. It may be at the beginning,
at the end, or anywhere upon the
margin, or it might be appended by a
ribbon, after the manner of the sealing
of ancient charters. The officer is not
required to certify to the sealing, but
it is sufficient if the seal be, in fact,
affixed and the name signed. Unquestionably, therefore, if the seal had
been placed where it is, and the signature only at the bottom of the last
part of the certificate, the whole would
have been sufficiently verified. I do
not think it is any less so by reason of
the words ' in testimonium, veritatis,'

THE MUNCIE NATION AL BANK v.BROWN.
with the signature opposite the seal,
between the two parts of the certificate. The whole may, with propriety,
be regarded as one certificate, once
sealed and twice signed. I adoptthis
conclusion the more readily, because
the objection is merely formal; the
certificate, in its present form, furnishing all the security against error,
and imposing upon the notary all the
responsibility which it would do if
another seal were added. * * * *
The case most nearly resembling the
present, of any to which our attention
has been called, is that of The State v.
6byle, 33 Me. 427. In that case, a
complaint and justice's warrant in
pursuance of it, were written on the
same piece of paper, and the only
seal was at the end of the justice's
signature to the complaint, the warrant being written beneath it. It was
held that the warrant was sufficiently
sealed. These authorities, particularly the last, justify the admission ot
the certificate of the notary, especially as such certificate furnishes presumptive proof only of the facts contained in it, concluding neither of the
parties :" Olcott v. Tioga R. B. Co.,
27 N. Y. 546 ; affirming 40 Barb. 179.
Recording seals. Necessarily deeds
and mortgages must be acknowledged
before an officer authorized to take
the acknowledgment, and if lie have
a seal, he must affix it to his certificate of acknowledgment. When the
deed or mortgage is recorded, it is difficult or impossible, in fact, to record
the impression made by the seal.
What effect has this on the record?
Said the court, in Griffin v. Shefimld,
38 Miss. 359, "the statute of registration does not contemplate the recording of the impression of a public seal;
and hence it is no objection to the
admission in evidence of a certified
copy of a recorded deed, that a copy
of the impression of the official seal of
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the officer who took the acknowledgment of the grantor does not appear
on it, if it be stated in the body of the
certificate of acknowledgment that it
was certified under such official seal."
In Smith v. Dall, 13 Cal. 510, it was
held that the omission, in the record
of a deed, to make a copy of the seal,
or some mark to indicate the seal,
does not vitiate the record ; but that
it is"enough if it appear from the
record that the instrument copied is
under seal." See Jones v. MarLin, 16
Cal. 165. In Putney v. Caller, 54 Wis.
66, whilst-citing the cases, it was said:
"Whether we would be justified in
going to the extent of these decisions,
may be doubtful. It has certainly
been held by other courts, that' when

the record of a deed does not show a
copy of the seal as such copies are
usually made in records, the presumption is that there was no seal on the
original. In the case at bar, the
record does not 'showr a copy of the
seal as such copies are usually made
in records,' and hence it must be
proved that the corporate seal was
upon each of the original deeds in
question." See Hucy v. Van Wi, 23

Wis. 613.
Proving seal. The seal of a court
of admiralty, like a national seal,
proves itself. Accordingly, the record
of a court of vice-admiralty, in Bermuda, purporting to be certified by

the deputy registrar, tinder the seal
of the court, was held admissible in
evidence, without other proof of authenticity. In passing on the question, the court said: "The decree of
vice-admiralty admitted by the judge,
purported to be under the seal of the
court, and to be certified by the deputy registrar. It is contended by the
defendant that the record was not
duly authenticated. I am of a different opinion. The decisions relative
to the adjudications of foreign muni-
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cipal courts must be laid out of the
question. The seals of such courts
are never judicially recognized, but
must be proved: Anon., 9 Mod. 66;
Henry v. Adey, 3 East. 221; Collins v.
Mathew, 5 Id. 473. The cases of Ddea.
field v. Hand, 3 Johns. 310; and Church
v. .Habbart,2 Cranch, 187, are also of
this description. By common consent
and general usage, the seal of admiralty
has been considered as sufficiently
authenticating its records. No objection has prevailed against the reception of the decree of a court acting
on the law of nations, when established by its seal. The seal is deemed
to be evidence of itself, because such
courts are considered as courts of the
whole civilized world, and every person interested as a party: Green v.
Waller, 2 Ld. Raym. 893; Peake's Ev.
74; Swift's Ev. 7; Tue Maria, 1 Rob.
Adm. 340. The case of Yeaton v. Fry,
5 Cranch, 335, is not adverse to this
proposition. The seal of the viceadmiralty court was not proved by
extrinsic evidence. No stress could
have been put on the testimony of a
witness that he had once received from
his proctor a copy of the proceedings
in the said court under a similar seal,
or that similar papers had, by insurers and others, been considered anthentic. Such evidence was too feeble
to establish the fact for which it was
adduced on any reasonable foundation.
The seal then proved its own authenticity. 'Assuming the seal to be genuine,' said GOULD, J., in Gri.wold v.
Pitcairn,2 Conn. 91, ' the fact (that it
was affixed by a proper officer) must,
of course, be proved, unless the contrary is shown. For any higher evidence of the fact appearing upon the
face of the record, than the seal i'self
imports, is impossible, and to require
extrinsic evidence of it, would be to
subvert the ruleitself, that a national
seal is the highest proof of authen-

ticitv
These remarks are applicable
to the seal of a court of admiralty,
and for this obvious reason, because,
equally with a national seal, it proves
itself. As to Gardere v. Columbia Ins.
Co., 7 Johns. 514, it professedly
waives the question before the court.
The seal in that case has (had) been
proved by extrins'c evidence. 'It is,
therefore,' said YATRS, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, 'unnecessary to notice the distinction urged
in the argument, between foreign municipal tribunals and courts of admiralty!"
Authentication under a private seal
is of no effect: Church v. .Hubbart, 2
Cranch, 187.
In Y aton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335, it
was held, that copies of the proceedings of the vice-admiralty court of
Jamaica, are admissible in evidence,
when certified under the seal of the
court, by the deputy registrar, who
was certified to by the judge of the
court, and lie by a notary public.
P-roof of the official characterof a notary public is not necessary. " By the
customary law of nations, as well as
the law merchant, the official acts of
a notary public are authenticated by
his seal :" Dunn v. Adams, 1 Ala.
527; and his certificate under his notarial seal isprima facie evidence that
he is a notary duly commissioned:
Browne v. Philadelphia Bank, 6 S. &
R. 484.
Judicial notice of seals. Courts
will take judicial notice of the seals
of notaries public, for they are officers recognized by the commercial
law of the world: Pierce v. lndseth,
106 U. S. 546; citing Townsley v.
Sumrall, 2 Pet. 179; C'anoine v. Fow.ler, 3 Wend. 173; Cartcr v. Burlcy, 9
N. H. 559; Hallidayv. McDougall,20
Wend. 81. See also Anon., 12 Mod.
345; Wright v. Barnard,2 Esp. 700;
Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335; Bi owne
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v. Philadelphia Bank, 6 S. & R. 484;
Porterv. Judson, 1 Gray, 175; Hutchcon v. Mannington, 6 Ves. 823; U. S.
v. Libby, 1 Wood & Al. 221. So
courts will take judicial knowledge
of the great seal of a foreign country:
United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 416;
The Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat.
283; Anon.,9 Mod. 66; Lincoln v.
Battelle, 6 Wend. 475 ; United States v.
Tgaqner, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 585; Griswold v. Pitcairn,2 Conn. 85; Church
v. llubbart, 2 Cranch, 187. But the
courts will not judicially notice the
seal of a government which has not
been recognized by the sovereign
power of the country under which
those tribunals are constituted: City
of Berne v. Bank of England,9 Ves.
3147; UnitedStates v. Palmer,3 Wheat.
610. Such a seal may, however, be
proven by the evidence of witnesses:
United States v. Palmer,3 Wheat. 610,
634; The Estrella, 4 Id. 298. See
Hatfield v. Jameson, 2 Munf. 53, 70,
71.
So, as we have elsewhere seen, foreign admiralty and maritime courts,
being the courts of the civilized
world, and of co-ordinate jurisdiction,
are judicially recognized, and their
seals need not be proved: Oroudson v.
Leonard,4 Cranch, 435; Rose v. Hrimely, 4 Id. 241, 292; Church v. Hubbard,
2 Id. 187; Thompson v. Stewar4 3
Conn. 171; Green v. Waller, 2 Ld.
Raym. 891 ; Anon., 9 Mod. 66.
So courts of this country will recognize the seal of a court in a sister
State, when the certificate of its clerk
or prothonotary is authenticated by
the presiding judge thereof: Clark v.
Depcw, 25 Pa. St. 509; Coffee v. Neely,
2 Ieisk. 304. If there be no seal,
the fact should be stated in the certificate of the clerk or judges; for
the courts always presume that
another court has a seal, unless it is a
domestic court: Kirkland v. Smith, 2

Mart. (La.) N. S. 497; Alston v. Taylor, 1 Ilayw. 385. In such a cse, the
seal should be affixed to the clerk's
certificate rather than to the judge's
authentication: Turner v. Waddington, 3 Wash. C. C. 126.
The validity of a seal may always
be contested: Nicholls v. Webb, 8
Wheat. 326; Dickens v. Beal, 10 Pet.
582; Mullen v. Morris, 2 Barr. 86;
Bradley v. Northern Bank, 60 Ala.
258; Donegan v. Woed, 49 Id. 251.
Notarialseals. A notary public was
an officer known to the common law,
and to beone usinga seal. Itwill be
presumed, therefore, in the absence of
proof, that the common law is in
force in another State of the Union,
and that a notary acting there has a
seal. If the seal is not attached to
his certificate, it will be invalid and
of no force in evidence: Dumont v.
- cCracken, 6 Blackf.355.
This, however, is rather a harsh
rule to enforce agiinst a foreign notary; for it is well known that in several States notaries act without seals,
and are not required to keep them.
It is the general rule that a notary
can act only by and through his seal;
and in the absence of it, his acts or
statements cannot be proven by his
certificate: Rindskoff v. Malone, 9
Iowa, 540; Grand iPapidsv. Hastings,
36 Mich. 123; Wedel v. Hennan, 59
Cal. 507; Jowers v. Blandy, 58 Ga.
383.
For this reason, a depositionwill be
suppressed, unless it bears the official
seal of a notary : Stephens v. Williams,
46 Iowa 540. So, an affidavit: Tunis
v. Withrow, 10 Iowa, 305 ; Stephens v.
Williams, 46 Id. 541 ; Stone v. Miller,
60 Id. 249; Hinckley v. O'Farrel,4
Blackf. 185. See Smith v. Bondurant,
74 Ga. 416; Cary v. State, 76 Ala.
78.
Where a statute made the execution,
acknowledgment, and proper certi.
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ficate of a notary essential to the conveyance of an estate of a married
woman, the absence of his seal was
held to render such conveyance void;
for the statute must be strictly pursued: Ewald v. Corbet4 32 Cal. 493;
Barrettv. Tewksbury, 9 Id. 14; Hastings v. Vaughn, 5 Id. 315. Such a
certificate, it was held, could not be
corrected by the notary, nor by a
court of equity, even though she received, with her husband, a valuable
consideration for the land conveyed:
Barrett v. Tewk"bury, supra; Bours v.
Zachariah, 11 Cal. 281.
In Wisconsin, it was said of a notary:
"It is true that he did not affix his
official seal; but it has frequently
been held under similar statutes, that
the certificate of acknowledgment
need not be auti:enticated by the notarial seal." That was said of the
acknowledgment of the execution of
a deed taken by the notary: Maxwell
v. ITartman, 50 Wis. 660; citing
Farnum, v. Buffum, 4 Cush. 260;
Learned v. Riley, 14 Allen, 109; Baze
v. Arper, 6 Minn. 220; Thompson v.
.Morqan,Id. 292; Fund Commissioners
of Muskingum Co.v. Glass, 17 Ohio, 542.
Where a notary public had failed
to affix his seal to a protest, it was
held, that he "had the right at the
time (of the objection to its admission in evidence) to affix his seal,
and thus every difficulty would have
been obviated;" and that a general
objection to the reception of the protest in evidence, was non-availing, the
absence of a seal must have been
specifically pointed out if relied upon:
Riadskoof v. 3Malone, 9 Iowa, 540.
So where a notary took a deposition and failed to attach his seal to
the certificate, he could amend by attaching his seal thereto, and the deposition could then be used in evidence: Chapman v. Allen, 15 Texas,
282.

A statute provided that " no notarial act shall be valid unless the seal
of office be appended." A notary
affixing the seal of the county court,
instead of his notarial seal, to the
certificate of acknowledgment of a
married woman and her husband; it
was held, that the certificate had no
validity whatever until his seal of
office was affixed, and that the fems
covert was at liberty to retract her
acknowledgment, in any manner she
saw proper, at any time prior to such
seal being afixed: M Kellar v. Peek,
39 Texas, 381.
That a seal of the notary is essential to the validity of his act, see
Richards v. Randolph, 5 Mason, 115;
Little v. Dodge, 32 Ark. 453 Booth
v. Cook, 20 Ill. 1"29; Iolbrook v.
Nichol, 36 Id. 161 ; Miller v. Ienshaw,
4 Dana, 325; Kemper v. Irughes, 7 B.
Mon. 255; Buel v. Irwia, 2-5lich.
145; Duncan v. Duncan, I Watts, 322;
Barney v. Sutton, 2 Id. 31 ; McCreary
v.AlcCreary, 9 Rich. Eq.34; Ballardv.
Perry, 28 Texas, 347; Texas Land Cb.
v. Williams, 51 Id. 51.
In a number of cases, however, it
hasbeen held that aseal is not essential to the validity of a certificate of
acknowledgment taken by a notary,
as elsewhere stated, unless required
by an express statute: Powers v. Bryant, 7 Port. (S. C.) 9; Harrisonv. Simons, 55 Ala. 510; Irving v. Brownell,
11 Ill. 402; Thompson v. .,Pbertson, 9
B. Mon. 383; Farnum v. Buffum, 4
Cush. 260; Thompson v. Mo1rgan, 6
Minn. 292; Fund Commissioners v.
Glass, 17 Ohio, 542; Jaques v. Weeks,
7 Watts, 261 ;Second NationalBank v.
Chancellor,9 W. Va. 69.
Where the officer had failed to attach his seal to the jurat of a deed of
assignment, and both parties, acting
in good faith, supposed the deed was
properly acknowledged, he was allowed to attach his seal even after his
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term of office had expired: Smith v.
Bondurant, 74 Geo. 416; see Cary v.
State, 76 Ala. 78.
Executions. In The .zEaa insurance Company v. Stoddard, 6 Wall.
556, an order of sale on a decree of
foreclosure of a mortgage, was issued
by the clerk of the co .rt without the
seal of the court attached. The instrument was a mere copy of the decree
with the clerk's certificate without the
seal of the court appended, certifying
that it was a true copy of the original.
In an action of ejectment, this certified copy was offered in evidence by
the defendant, who claimed under the
sale made by the sheriff under this
copy. The court refused to allow it
in evidence, and gave judgment for
the plaintiff, who was the judgment
defendant in the decree, or one claiming under him. On appeal, the judgnient was affirmed. The statute authorizing a sale by virtue of a copy
of the decree, provided that "a copy
of the order of sale and judgment
shall be iss:ied and certified by the
clerk under the seal of the court to
the sheriff, who shall thereulpon proceed to sell the mortgaged premises,""
etc. The court said: "Though the
order of sale here desc-ibed may not
come under the name of any of the
recognized common law writs of execution, as cap?*as,fieri facias, or others
yet it comes clearly within the function and supplies the purpose of an
execation, ihat is, a process issuing
from a court to enforce its judgment.
The statute recognizes it as such, and
requires that it shall issue under the
seal of the court. The sheriff to
whom it is directed, is required to
proceed 'as upon execution. If the
debt is not satisfied by the sale of the
property specifically mentioned in the
order, it then operates as afierifacias,
under which the sheriff is directed to
levy the residue, of any other propVOL. XXXVI.--42

erty of the defendant. It is, therefore, to all intents and purposes an
execution, and the statute expressly
requires that it must issue under the
seal of the court. Without the seal
it is void. We cannot distinguish it
from any other writ or process in this
particular. It is equally clear that
under the Indiana statute, the sheriff
could not sell without this order, certified under the seal of the court, and
placed in his hands. This is his authority, and if it is for any reason
void, his acts purporting to be done
under it, are also void." This was a
case from Indiana, and the Supreme
Court refused to follow it in Rose v.
Ingram, 98 Ind. 276. Other courts
have decided that the seal upon an
execution is matter of substance and
not amendable: Bailey v. Smith,12 Me.
196; Tibbetts v. Shaw, 19 Id. 204;
Witherel v. Bandall, 30 Id. 168; Ball

v. Jones, 9 Pick. 446; Swett v. Putrich, 2 Fairf. 179; Hutchins v. Edson,
1 N.H. 139 ; Shackleford v. APRBe, 3
Hawks. 226; Seawell v. Bank of Cape
Fear,3 Dev. 279; Boal v. Xing, 6 Ohio,
11. Where, after the lapse of along
period, a writ is offered in evidence, a
very slight and indistinct impression
will be presumed to have been made
by a seal: -eighway v. Pendleton, 15
Ohio, 755.
"So long as a seal is required to be
affixed to writs and executions, though
we may not be able to discover its
real use, yet we must not dispense with
what the law requires :" Porter v.
Haskell, 11 Me. 177, quoted in State v.
Flemming. 66 Id. 142.

A distinction has sometimes been
made between original and judicial
writs, using the latter term to distinguish such writs as issue during the
progress of a suit from those by which
suits are commenced. And it has been
said, that while executions and other
strictly judicial writs may be amended
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by having the seal of the court affixed also Clark v. Hellen, 1 Iredell's L.
to them, original writs cannot be thus 421. In Arnold v. -%'ye, 23 Mich. 286,
amended. This is the distinction re- Judge COOLEY said: "The want of a
ferred to, in Bailey v. Smith, 12 Me. seal, if one was really wanting, might
196; and see Sawyer v. Baker, 3 Id. have been supplied on motion to
29, but which was overruled in Porter amend, and did not render the execuv. Haskell, 11 Id. 177, and disapproved tion void." Other cases are to the
in State v. Flemming, 66 Id. 142.

The Supreme Court of Indiana refused to place the construction, upon
the statute in force in that State with
reference to issuing executions, which
was placed upon it in the case of The
,Ekuna Insurance Cb. v. Stoddard, 6

Wall. 556. It held, that the statute of
8 Henry IV, c. 12, authorizing the
amendment of " writs," was in force
in that State, and authorized the affixing of the seal, by the clerk, after a
sale of the property. "There are
cases which hold, that writs without a
seal are not void, but voidable only,
and that they may be amended, after
they have been served, by attaching
the seal. We incline to follow that
line of decisions which holds, that
process, without the proper seal, is
voidable only, and therefore amendable, as being more in consonance
with the general spirit of the law,
which regards substance more than
form. Much hardship and injury
might accrue to purchasers of property on execution or their vendees, if
the sale happened to be made on an
execution to which the seal, by inadvertence of the clerk, bad not been
affixed, if the defect could not be
amended by affixingthe seal e' Hunter
v. Th7 Burnsville Turnpike Co., 56 Ind.
213. So, in Purcell v. McFarland, 1

Iredell's L. 34, it was held, that
where the clerk of a superior court
had omitted to affix the seal to writs
offi.fa. and vend. ex. the court might,
at a subsequent term, order the clerk
to affix the seal to the executions, nun
pro tune, in order to protect the purchaser of land sold under them. See

same effect: Jack-on v. Brown, 4 Cow.
550 ; People v. Dunning, 1 Wend. 16;
Boss v. Luther, 4 Cowen, 158; Deterv.
Akin, 40 Ga. 429; Bridewell v. .Moon,
25 Ark. 524; Csorwith v. &ate Bank of
ilinois,18 Wis. 560; Sabin v. Austin,
19 Id. 421; Rose v. Ingram, 98 Ind.
276. Freeman prefers the latter line
of cases: Freeman on Executions,
46 and 70.
If the rights of innocent purchasers
would be affected by the amendment,
it would, perhaps, not be allowed:
Purcellv.McFarland,1 Iredell's L. 35.
Summons. In Indiana the code
provides that "no summons, or service thereof, shall be set aside, or
adjudged insufficient, when there is
sufficient substance about either to
inform the party on whom it may be
served, that there is an action instituted against iaim in court!' A summons was issued and served, without
the seal of the court out of which it
was issued, and it was held, that this
was not a good cause fo review of
the judgment. The summons was not
void, "though perhaps voidable, and
therefore amendable, and that, until
set aside in a proper application for
that purpose, they and each of them
may well be held to be sufficient. The
court below, of its own motion, or
upon the motion of any interested
party, may at any time cause the
proper seal to be affixed to the summons, and thus validate and render it
effectual ab initio, for all purposes:"
Boyd v. Fitch, 71 Ind. 306. The court
has the right to order the clerk to
affix the seal nunc pro tune, to such a
summons issued previous to, and re-
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WYrrits of (,ttachutnt. In Foss v.
Isett,4 G. Green (Ia.), 76, a writ of
term has closed: The State v. Davis, attachment was issued by the clerk of
the court without the seal of the
73 Ind.359.
Other courts, however, hold such court, and on motion to amend the
powers void, and all proceedings writ by attaching the seal, the court
v. allowed it; but on appeal, this was
thereunder also void: ||Woolford
.Dugan,2 Ark. 131. See Williams v. held error sufficient to reverse the
T'anmdre, 19 Ill. 293; leaton v. law. "Before the property of the deThompson, 20 Minn. 196; Reeder v. fendant could be seized, it was indispensable that the plaintiff should obMIfurray, 3 Ark. 450.
Venire for grand jury. In Maine tain a writ. A paper issued by the
it was held, that if a venire issue for clerk in the form of a writ is no writ,
a grand jury without the seal of the unless it has impressed upon it the
court, a plea setting up such facts is seal of the court from whence it
sufficient to abate the indictment, and issues. Without this seal, it is no
the defect, or absence of the seal, is more fox the purpose of a writ than
one which cannot be cured by amend- blank paper. Could it be amended?
ment, nor can it be remedied by a Not at all; for there is nothing to
special statute, passed for that pur- amend. It lacks the essential ingrepose. The court said: "Is the defect dient of a writ, and is not amendable.
amendable? We think not. Every It is the seal, other things being right,
indictment to be valid, must be found which makes it a writ, gives it force,
by a grand jury legally selected, and efficacy, and life. The property which
competent to act at the time the in- had been seized upon this void paper,
dictment is found. To put the seal could not be held in custody upon a
upon these venires now would not writ issued after it was attached,
make sealed instruments of them at which would be the case if the seal
the time thev were served. They could be subsequently affixed. The
have performed their office and are numerous authorities cited by the
fundi officio. To seal them now and counsel for appellee are not applicathen hold that they were legal instru- ble to the question presented by this
ments" wlkp served, and when they record. Neither are the provisions of
had no seals upon them, would seem the code broad enough to cover the
more like trifling than the perform- case. This was not properly an
ance of a grave and important duty." amendment which was proposed. It
The statute in question applied only was the creation of a new writ. This
to those venires issued from a partic- could be done, but not so as to operate
ular court of a particular county at a retrospectively upon any prior proparticular term. It was held thatthe ceedings. With the seal, it became
effect of the act was to render valid an for the first time a writ, and the party
invalid indictment already found; and to make it available should proceed
was also a suspension of the general upon it de nero." See Barber v.,Swan,
law of the State for individual cases 4 G. Green (Ia.), 352.
Foss v. Isett, supra, was followed in
or a particular locality. For both
reasons the act was void. Such an Shaffer v. Suandrall 33 Iowa, 579,
act is, in principle, as objectionable as where it was held that a writ issued
a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto from the Circuit court having the seal
law: State v. Flemming, 66 Ale. 142. of the District court impressed upon

turnable at, a former term, after judgment has been entered and after the
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it, was void, and the defect could not
be cured by amendment. The revised
code of Iowa, enacted after these
cases were decided, provides, in the
chapter relating to attachments, that
"this chapter shall be liberally construed, and the plaintiff, at any time
when objection is made thereto, shall
he permitted to amend any defect in
the petition, affidavit, bond, writ, or
other proceeding; and no attachment
shall be quashed, dismissed, or the
property attached released, if the defect in any of the proceedings has or
can be amended so as to show that a
legal cause for the attachment exists
at the time it was issued," etc. Under
this section, the Iowa Supreme Court
has held that a writ of attachment
sealed with the wrong seal, may be
amended by attaching the proper
seal: Murdough v.McPherrin,49 Iowa,
479. See Magoon v. Gillett, 54 Id. 55.
The New York code provides that
"the court may, at any time, in furtherance of justice, and on such
terms as may be proper, amend any
pleading or proceeding by adding or
striking out the name of any party,
or by correcting a mistake in the
name of a party, or a mistake in any
other respect, or by inserting other
allegations material to the case," etc.
This was considered broad enough to
allow a seal, omitted in issuing a
writ of attachment, to be supplied:
Talcott v. Rosenberg, 8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
287.
A mere scroll used by the notary
for a seal, is not a sufficient authentication of an affidavit for a writ of
attachment: Hinckley v. O'Farrel, 4
Blackf. 185. That such an affidavit
cannot be amended under the usual
statutes allowing amendment of pleadings, it has been held, in Watt v.
Cames, 4 lleisk. 532. But see supra.
Although somewhat out of order, we
may state that in Maloney v. Woodin,

11 Hun, 202, the seal of a surrogate
was affixed pending the trial.
Warrants. In Hunter v. The Burnsville Turnpike Company,56 Ind. 213, it
was said, in referring to the right to
attach the seal to an execution after
sale, "So, too, a sheriff who arrests a
party on criminal process, perfect in
all respects except the seal, would be
liable to an action of trespass, unless
the defect could be amended." In
Dominick v. Eacker, 3 Barb. 17, a
sheriff was sued in trespass for arresting the plaintiff under process to
which the seal of the wrong court
was affixed, which was held by the
court to be equivalent to having no
seal affixed. But it was held, that
the process was amendable, and that
the defendant could justift' under it.
Other cases hold that a warrant
without the seal is void, and the officer
holding it acts at his peril; and if
killed in making the arrest by the
person he is endeavoring to arrest,
the offense is only manslaughter, the
same as if an arrest was attempted
without a warrant, where the per-on
resisting was not guilty of an oflbnse:
Tackelt v. State, 3 Yerg. 392; Bell v.
Farnmsorth,11 Humph. 609. See Galvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 291.
Writ of error. A writ of error
issued without the seal of the court
issuing it is void: Orerton v. Check,
22 How. 46. Such a writ cannot be
amended by attaching the seal, even
though it had been placed within the
proper clerk's office within the required time: Mayor, etc., of Washington v. Dennison, 6 Wall. 495. So on
appeal, if the transcript have not the
seal of the court below, the appeal
will be dismissed: Jones v. Frost, 42
Ind. 543; Iinton v. Brown, 1 Blackf.
429; Sanford v. Sinton, 34 Ind. 539;
Vanliew v. State, 10 Id. 3S4.
W. W. ToRNTo.;.
Crawfordsville, Ind.
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Court of Appeals of Bew York.
SERVISS v. McDONNELL.

Defendant, upon the death of one of the members of a partnership, entered
into an agreement of partnership with the surviving members to continue the
business, and it was thereby agreed that defendant should pay a certain portion of the liabilities of the late firm. Plaintiff was a creditor of the old
firm, and it appeared there had been no change of credit, or communication
of any kind between plaintiff and defendant. Held, that defendant was not
liable for the debts of the old firm 's of course, and that plaintiff could
not maintain an action against defendant on her agreement with her partners
to pay a certain portion of the debts of the old firm.
An exception not taken in the court below cannot be available on appeal.

APPPA. from General Term, Supreme Court, Third Department.
N. C. Mfoak, for appellant and respondent.
N. P. ITInman, for respondent and appellant.
DANFORTH, J.-The plaintiff was the owner of two notes,
each made by John McDonnell, Perry Kline, and Thomas Harvey, who thereby jointly and severally promised to pay to his
order, in one case $500, and in the other $2,000, in one year
from April 1, 1873, with interest. The makers constituted the
firm of McDonnell, Kline & Co., and the notes were given in
consideration of money loaned to them in that capacity. One
of the makers, John McDonnell, died, and the complaint
alleges that thereafter, andin February, 1878, Lucy McDonnell,
Perry Kline, and Thomas Harvey formed a new firm under the
same name of McDonnell, Kline & Co., and, in consideration of
a transfer to them of the business and property of the old firm,
agreed to pay into said new firm, and for the purpose of carrying on said business, certain large sums of money, and to assume
and pay all the obligations, debts, and liabilities of said former
firm of McDonnell, Kline & Co., among which debts, liabilities,
and obligations were the two promissory notes above referred to;
that no part of either of said promissory notes has been paid,
except that the interest has been paid to April 1, 1887 ; and for
the principal sum, with interest, the plaintiff asked judgment
against Lucy McDonnell and Thomas Harvey. The action was
commenced February 7, 1884, and the defendant, Lucy MoDon-
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nell, alone answered, in substance denying all the material allegations of the complaint, and setting up the alleged cause of
action did not accrue within six years. Upon the trial at the
circuit, before a justice of the Supreme Court and a jury, the only
proposition seriously litigated was the liability of Mrs. McDonnell, and to establish that parol evidence alone wasgiven. Its force
need not be considered, for at a subsequent stage of the trial she
put in evidence written i-astruments which contain the agreement
by which alone she can be bound, and the question upon the
whole ease was finally submitted to the trial judge as one of law.
He not only denied the defendant's motion for a non-suit, but
also refused to rule, when subsequently requested by her counsel,
"that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover against her onethird of the amount due upon the notes," and, upon the plaintiff's application, directed a verdict in his Ihvor upon the whole
sum claimed, and judgment was entered. Upon the defendant's
appeal to the general term, that court modified the judgment by
reducing it to one-third, and from the judgment so modified both
parties appeal to this court,-the plaintiff, against the modification ; and the defendant, because it was not altogether set at
naught.
The plaintiff's appeal is so filly met by the reasoning of the
learned judge at general term that little need be said. An incoming partner is not, as of course, liable for the debts of the
firm, whether he succeeds an outgoing partner by purchase, or
whether, upon the death of one partner, he joins with the sIrvivors in carrying on the business of the firm by virtue of a
new partnership. He may become liable by agreement; but an
undertaking on his part alone, or in connection with others, that
the new firm will pay the debts of the old firm, can be enforced
only by the old firm, and the creditors could not sue for the
breach of it. The evidence which led the general term to modify the judgment was a written instrument dated February 25,
1878, executed by Lucy McDonnell, her son, Willard McDonnell, Perry Kline, and Thomas Harvey. By its terms, tht.-e
persons became partners under the name of McDonnell, Kline
& Co., to continue the business theretofore conducted by the
former firm of that name, for such time as they should agree,
with a capital equal to the amount of the capital of the old
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firm; and it was declared that Mrs. MciDonnell and Willard
McDonnell, as parties of the first part thereto, were to pay onethird of the liabilities of the late firm of McDonnell, Kline &
Co., and were jointly to receive one-third of the profits of said
business, to pay one-third of the expenses of conducting it, and
bear and pay one-third of all losses which might happen, and
furnish one-third of the capital. The parties of the second and
third parts were each to receive one-third of the profits, to furnish one-third of the capital, bear and pay one-third of all expense in conducting said business, and one-third of all losses
which might happen or occur. The learned court held that the
defendant's liability must be measured by this agreement, and
could not exceed one-third of the debts of the old firm. In this
conclusion the learned judg was clearly right. The agreement
contained the terms on which the defendant became a member
of the firm, and expressed the fall extent of .her obligation,
whether it inured to the surviving members of the old firm, or
to its creditors. The plaintiff's appeal must therefore, in any
view of the case, fail. If lie could maintain an action at all, it
could be only for the one-third which came within the terms of
the agreement.
But the defendant also appeals. Her contention is that the
plaintiff's contract was with the members of the old firm ; that
there has been no change of credit, not even a communication

with her, much less a promise on his part to accept her as his
debtor. Upon the record before us that contention is well
founded, and the adjudged cases show that without some one of
these things being done, or some analogous act on the part of a
creditor, he cannot maintain an action on such an agreement as
that by which the defendant bound herself. Here it is apparent

that the obligation of the defendant to her copartners is the only
foundation for the plaintiff 's action, and there is no circumstance
in the case to exempt him from the general rule of law that one
who is not a party to a contract cannot sue in respect of a breach
of duty arising out of the contract. Aforeover, our decision in
TVlteat v. Bice, 97 N. Y. 296, is justly relied upon as controlling
the disposition of this case. In, that, the undertaking of the
defendant was to "assume and pay one-quarter of all the indebtedness" of the firm named. In this, the defendant, jointly with
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her son, promised "to pay one-third of the liabilities of the late
firm." The cases cannot be distinguished, and the principle
applied in that cited would seem to require the reversal of the
judgment, if the defendant was in condition to avail herself of
it. It is obvious, however, from the record, that no such question was raised at the trial term, and, so far as appears, the
point is taken for the first time in this court. This will not do.
Had it been raised in season, it might, perhaps, have been obviated. In such a case, it is well settled that an exception not
taken in the court below cannot be available on appeal. The
defendant's appeal must therefore also fail, and the judgment of
the general term be affirmed.
(All concur, except -IRPALLO,J., absent.)
An incoming partner does not, ordinarily, become, by his entry into the
firm, liable to the firm creditors for
anything done before he became a
partner. His entry is not a ratification of what his partners have done
previous to his joining: Young v.
Hunter, 4 Taunt. 582; .Ex parteJackson, 1 Ves. Jr. 131 ; Babcock v. Stewart,
58 Pa. St. 179; Deerev. Plant, 42 Mo.
60; Hirt v. Tonlinson, 2 Vt. 103;
Adkins v. Arthur, 33 Tex. 431; Atwood v. Lockhart, 4 .Lean, 350.
There is no presumption that such
partner assumes such liability: Fuller
v ,)we, 59 Barb. 344; s. c. 57 New
York, 23; the presumption, on the
contrary, is that there is no such assumption: Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa.
St. 235. A wife who becomes a partner in the place of her deceased husband, is presumptively liable for his
partnership debts: Preusser v. Henshaw, 49 Iowa, 41.
An incoming partner may be liable
by a new, though tacit contract made
after he joined the firm. Where A.
agreed to furnish B.with bricks at so
much per thousand, and after he had
begun to supply them, B. entered into
partnership with C., it was held that

B. and C. were liable to pay at the
rate agreed upon for the bricks, supplied to both after the partnership had
commenced, for the reason that as 1.
had not ordered any definite number
of bricks, each delivery and acceptance raised a new tacit promise to
pay in the old terms: Dyke v. Brewer,
2 Car. & Kir. 828; Heldsby v. Mears,
5 B. & C. 504.
Even where a new partner agrees
with the old that the debts of the old
firm shall be taken by the new, this
agreement as regards strangers, is res
inter alias acta, and does not give them
(the creditors) any right to sue the
new firm. To warrant such suit,
there must be some agreement between the new member and the creditors, and it must be founded on some
sufficient consideration: 1 Lindley
on Partnership (4th ed.) 392.
In the case of Mheat et al. v. Rice
et al., 97 N. Y. 296, decided in 1884,
the firm of S. R. & Co. were indebted
to several creditors. By a written
agreement, S. of said firm sold to the
plaintiffs, "the equal undivided onequarter of all the personal property
of the firm of S. R. & Co.," in consideration whereof the plaintiffs agreed
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to pay to S. $3,000, and "to assume
and pay one-quarter of the present
incumbrances on the property, and
one-quarter of the indebtedness of the
firm of S. II. & Co., as the same may
The
become due and payable"
agreement further stipulated, "that
by reason of said purchase, the plaintiffs became members of the firm of
S. R. & Co. to the amount of onequarter interest in all property belonging to said firm and liable to pay
the indebtedness of said firm in the
same manner and to the same extent
as if they had been members of the
original firm of S. R. & Co." It was
held that no creditor could enforce
this agreement. "There is no promise," say the court, "to pay any
single one of the creditors or for the
benefit of any one of them. The
promise was made to S. and for his
benefit and that of the firm alone.
The contract would have been fulfilled by paying to said firm, onequarter of the amount of their indebtedness. No one, nor any specified
and identical creditor, could show in
advance of payment to him, that the
promise was intended for his benefit.
It would be a very great extension of
the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (post),
to give a right of action to a creditor
for whose benefit the promise might
or might not have been madeP
In Barlow v. Myers, 64 N. Y. 41,
where the promise was to pay generally, "the debts of R. & W. without
specification of the particular debts or
naming the creditors of the firm, attention was called to the fact that, in
this respect, the case differed from all
the cases in which the right of action
had been sustained in behalf of the
third party. But while there it was
possible to say, that the creditors were
sufficiently identified as belonging to
a class, all of whom were to be paid,
here no class is named or described,
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and who was to be paid by the promisor, and to what extent, is left absolutely uncertain and undetermined.
We prefer to restrict the doctrine of
Lawrence v. Fox within the precise
limits of its original application."
An equally strict application of this
rule is found in the case of JlXorehwad
v. Wi*ton et al., 73 N. C. 393. Tlis
was a suit by a creditor against the
new, for a debt of the old firm. When
Wriston entered the partnership, he
agreed that the new partnership
should pay the debts of the old firm,
and his promise was made upon sufficient consideration. The court held
that the creditors could not recover,
unless there was an agreement between him and the new partner, and
upon a sufficient consideration. And
the fact that the new firm paid the
creditor the interest on his debt, was
sufficient to prove the agreement between the partners only, and not show
any agreement between the creditor
and the incoming partner.
In the case of Merrill et al. v. Green
e al., 55 N. Y. 270, where, upon a dissolution of a firm, one partner executed to another. a bond with surety,
conditioned for the payment by the
partner executing it, of all the firm
debts, it was held, that the liability
of the obligors was to the obligee
only, not to the creditors, and a firm
creditor could not maintain an action
thereon.
To the same effect are Verev.Ashby,
10 B. & 0. 298; Ez parte Peele, 6 Ves.
602; Ex parte Williams, Buck, 13;
Micks v. Wyatt, 23 Ark. 55; .T1yer v.
Norton, 26 Ind.269; 1)urandv. Ourtis,
57 N. Y. 7; Meador v. .ughes, 14
Bush, 652; lWr-ight
v. Broameau, 73 Ill.
381 ; .Parmaleev. Wiggenhorn, 6 Neb.
322; Fagan v. Long, 30 AMo. 222;
Stenburg v. Callanan, 14 Iowa, 251.
Very slight testimony is sufficient
to prove an assumption by a new
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partner of the old debts: Crossv. Bur
lington.A.at..Bank, 17 Kan. 336; Wheat
v. Hamilton, 53 Ind. 256; Shoemaker
Piano Co. v. Bernard, 2 Lea, (Tenn.)
358; Spaunhorst v. Link, 46 Mo. 197;
Updike v..Doyle, 7 R.I. 446; Markham
v. Hazen, Ga. 570.
Where the assumption of the debts
of the old concern is the consideration for the incoming partner's'
interest, and the transaction between
the incoming, and the other partners,
is such as to give a third person an
interest in the consideration, a creditor of the old firm may sue the new
partnership: Hopkins v. Johnson, 2
La. Ann. 842; Hughes v. Waldo, 14
Id. 348; Peyton v. Lewis, 12 B. Mon.
356; Crowellv. Sandidge,5 Dana, 210;
Diz v. Otis, 5 Pick. 38; Bank-in v.
Shephardson, 89 Ill. 445; Shaw v.
.3cGregory,105 Mass. 96; COrum v.
Abbott, 2 McLean, 233; Ez parte
Whitmore, 3 Deacon, 365;
olfe v.
R-7ower, L. R. 1 P. C. 27.
In Poole v. RIntrager,60 Iowa, 180,
the defendant purchased Harper's
interest in a firm and bound himself
to pay the firm debts, in consideration
of the interest purchased. It was
held, that a creditor of the old firm
could sue. "If Hintrager, in consideration of the purchase of the
property from Harper had agreed to
pay the latter's debts, his creditors
could recover upon the contract, although they were not parties thereto,
nor cognizant thereof when the
agreement was made. The fact that
the property purchased was an interest in a co-partnership, and the creditors to be paid are those of the firm,
cannot require the application of a
different rule."
The cases in New York, in which
a creditor has been allowed to sue the
new firm for a debt of the old, generally rest upon the authority of
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268. In

this case, Holly, at the request of Fox,
loaned and advanced him $300, stating
at the time that he owed that sum
to Lawrence for money borrowed of
him and had agreed to pay it to him.
Fox, in consideration of the loan and
at the time of receiving it, promised
to pay the amount to Lawrence. It
was held, that the plaintiff could recover upon this promise to Holly, and
that upon proof of a promise made to
Holly to pay Lawrence, a promise to
pay the latter would be implied; and
that the consideration between Holly
and Fox was sufficient to support the
latter's promise to pay the plaintiff.
In Arnold et al. v. YNichols, 64 N. Y.
117, B. was engaged in business and
borrowed of plaintiff money to carry
it on. He afterwards entered into
partnership with Nichols and transferred to the firm his business assets,
and in consideration thereof, the firm
assumed and agreed to pay certain
specified debts of B., among them,
that of the plaintiffs. It was held
that as B. had transferred to the firm,
the assets to which his creditors had
the right to look for payment of their
claim, the promise of the firm to pay
such claims must be deemed to have
been made for their benefit.
In Claflin et al. v. Ostrom, 54 N. Y.
581, H. and 0. being partners, H.
sold out his interest in the firm
property to 0., who agreed to pay the
firm debts, among them, a debt due
ilaintiff. The defendant guaranteed
the performance of this agreement.
The plaintiff not being paid, H. assigned to him his interest and claim
under the agreement and guarantee.
It was held that the plaintiff could
recover either directly on the guarantee, which he could adopt and enforce in his own name, or upon the
assignment.
In Barlow et al. v. yers, 64 N.Y.
41, plaintiffs, as holders of certain
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promissory notes, made by the firm of
R. & V., brought suit against the defendant upon her promise to pay the
debts of the said firm, as consideration
of the assignment to her of the firm's
property and assets. It was held,
upon the authorityof Lawrence v..Fox,
that the creditors could recover.
In Francis v. Simith, 1 Duv. 121,
F. by covenant bound himself to assume all the debts and liabilities of S.
in the late firm of S. & 0. and save
S. harmless on account of all such
debts. Hdd, that a creditcr of the
firm was entitled by substitution to a
personal judgment against F. on his
covenant, as S., who was the only one
who could object, consented thereto.
If, after a new partner enters a firm,
his co-partners give a bill or note in
their and his names for a previous
debt contracted by the old firm, lie is
not liable to a holder with notice:
Shirriff v. Wilks, 1 East. 48. Nor
will lie be made liable for an old
debt, by his co-partners furnishing an
account stated to the creditor, in
which lie admitted that the debt was
due by the firm: French v. French,
2 Mem. & Gr. 644; Lentere v. Ellitg
6 H. & N. 656.
He may be made liable to pay the
balance of an open running account,
commencing before he joined the
firm and continued afterwards, although payments have been made,
since he joined the firm, sufficient to
liquidate that part of the account for
which he is directly responsible:
.Beale v. Caddick, 2 H. & N. 326;
Scott v. Beale, 6 Jur. N. S. 559.
Wm. H. BuRF.N.
Philadelphia.

[The case of Bowman e al. v. Spalding, decided by the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky, February 5, 1887, is
interesting in the construction put
upon an agreement made between a
retiring partner, the remaining pat tners and an incoming partner.
The court held the new firm to be
trustees of the assets, which the
agreement specified, as to be received
by the new firm, for the purpose of
paying the debts of the o!d firm, and
thus keeping the retiring partner
indemnified, in addition to a personal
indemnity contained in theagreement.
Not only was a defense of the period
of limitation denied to the new firm,
upon being declared insolvent, and to
its creditors, but, going further, no
interest in the proceeds of these assets was allowed to the new firm and
its creditors, until the trust had been
discharged by payment of these debts;
and the retiring partner having taken
up certain claims himself, he was allowed payment in full out of the
proceeds of these assets. The retiring partner was put in the place of
the creditors he had paid, who were,
as already shown, entitled to proceed
against the new firm. See in addition
to the above citations, Townsend v.
Long, 77 Pa. St. 143; Bingo v.
Wing, S. Ct. Ark.,November 5, 1887;
Hocht v. Caughron, 46 Ark. 132;
Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa. St. 235.
The case of First Xational Bank of
.Pueblo v. .Newton, decided by the
Supreme Court of Colorado in 1887,
emphasizes the line of cases, not
embraced in the above annotation,
where the creditor refuses to accept
this transfer of liability.-J. B. U.]

